ABSTRACT. GOST 28147-89 is a well-known 256-bit block cipher. In 2010 GOST was submitted to ISO, to become an international standard. Then many academic attacks which allow to break full GOST faster than brute force have been found. The fastest known single-key attack on GOST for 2 64 of data is The common stereotype is that these will be "the best" attacks on GOST. However, ciphers are not used in practice with single keys, on the contrary. In this paper we intend to show that there exist attacks on GOST which are more versatile and even somewhat more "practical" than the best single key attack. We argument that multiple random key attacks not single key attacks, are more practical and more likely to be executed in the real life. They recover keys when other attacks recover none. One can break some (weaker) GOST keys in a population of 256-bit keys generated at random with a TOTAL computational effort as low as 2 120 , this including the cost to examine also the cases in which the attack does not work. All our attacks are based on special non-trivial properties of data inside the cipher which however are such that keys for which the property does not hold can be rejected efficiently.
The GOST encryption standard and its security
The Russian encryption standard GOST 28147-89 is an important government standard [25] which is also widely used by large banks [15] , [24] , on the Internet with OpenSSL [15] , and in entreprise security systems (e.g., RSA Labs). Its large c 2013 Mathematical Institute, Slovak Academy of Sciences. K e y w o r d s: block ciphers, Feistel schemes, key scheduling, self-similarity, fixed points, reflection attacks, black-box reductions.
key size of 256 bits and exceptionally low implementation cost [20] make GOST a plausible alternative for AES-256 and triple DES.
GOST is a block cipher with a simple Feistel structure, 64-bit block size, 256-bit keys and 32 rounds. Each round contains a key addition modulo 2 32 , a set of 8 bijective S-boxes on 4 bits, and a simple rotation by 11 positions. The most complete current reference implementation of GOST in the OpenSSL library contains eight standard sets of S-boxes [15] . The attacks we consider in this paper, as well as most other recent attacks on GOST from [6] , [7] , [17] work with a very similar complexity whatever are the S-boxes used in GOST. Until 2011, no cryptographically significant attack on GOST used in encryption was found, which was summarized in 2010 in these words: "despite considerable cryptanalytic efforts spent in the past 20 years, GOST is still not broken", see [20] . According to B i r y u k o v and W a g n e r , the structure of GOST, and in particular the reversed order of keys in the last 8 rounds, makes it secure against slide attacks [1] . However, this exact inversion of keys allows other so called "Reflection" attacks. This property marks a turning point in the security of GOST. Initially at Indocrypt 2008 only a weak-key attack with time complexity of 2 192 is proposed, with large proportion of 2 −32 of weak keys. Then in 2011 several attacks on regular GOST keys have been discovered, where by regular we mean typical keys generated at random, this including single key attacks. More than half of these new attacks use this reflection property, sometimes twice, three or four times [6] , [17] . Interestingly many other attacks allow to break GOST without this reflection property [6] , [7] , [14] . Some are fixed point or involution attacks, but some are entirely new sorts of self-similarity attacks. Most of these attacks follow the framework of "Black-Box Complexity Reduction" from [6] , [7] where the problem of attacking full 32-round GOST is reduced to a low-data complexity attack 8 rounds. Unhappily the quantity of data available after reduction is very small, for example 2, 3 or 4 pairs for a reduced cipher. Very few low-data complexity attacks are known. Accordingly the last step in these attacks is typically either a Meet-In-The-Middle attack [6] , [14] , [17] or a software algebraic attack [6] , [7] and recently a combination of both [6] , [8] . The best single-key attacks in this category are an attack with about 2
192 GOST computations [6] , [14] with 2 64 of data and about 2 224 GOST computations with 2 32 of data [6] , [14] , [17] .
In this paper we look at the possibility of obtaining strictly better "Complexity Reductions" for some weaker keys. However, we are not interested in weak key attacks. We are interested exclusively in attacks which can recover 256-bit GOST keys generated at random with a total effort being strictly lower than for a comparable single key attack. The main point is that weak keys and related keys CAN be exploited in the real life attacks IF they occur with sufficiently high "natural" probability for keys generated at random. The general
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attack scenario on block ciphers, relevant to say a government security agency, is the multiple key scenario as follows: given 2 X devices with distinct keys, 2 Y of data per device, and M = 2 Z of memory, some keys can be recovered at the total cost of T = 2 Z . It is surprising that this scenario is almost never studied in cryptography. This is probably because researchers are not aware of the fact that this multiple key scenario allows to recover (at least some) keys in situations where other attacks find none (and in particular all known single key attacks). Can we demonstrate such a thing for GOST? One basic question is as follows: given a well-chosen assumption which works for 2 −A of GOST keys, can we obtain an attack which is more than 2
A times faster the the best known single-key attack? If so we can afford to check also all the cases in which the attack does not work and overall obtain a more realistic attack than the reference single key attack. More importantly, in many cases rejecting the cases where the attack does not work will be easier than expected. We have designed many such attacks and the security of GOST degrades surprisingly quickly as X grows. In fact we obtain a whole spectrum of attacks and will show that the cost of computing one 256-bit GOST key decreases in a very important way down to 2 120 in this multiple key scenario. This at the price of increasing over data complexity 2 X+Y even though in many attacks we need only 2 32 of data per device. Somewhere half way there will be attacks where 2 X+Y is not too large and the computational effort is going to be more realistic than any other attack on GOST.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we cover brute force and reduced-round attacks on GOST. In Section 3 we explain how the paradigm of Black Box Reduction applies to GOST and in particular we explain the reflection property as consequence of a particular decomposition of GOST. In Section 4 we study 4 basic families of weak key attacks and the detailed cost of converting them to a "real" attack on multiple random keys. Our results are summarized in Table 1 Section 5 followed by a conclusion.
Preliminary remarks on GOST
In this paper we call a P/C pair a pair of known Plaintext and Ciphertext for full GOST, or for a reduced-round version of GOST.
GOST has 64-bit block size and the key size of 256-bit keys. Accordingly:
Ø 2.0.1º 4 P/C pairs are necessary to determine the GOST key. With
Justification:
We proceed as follows: we use one P/C pair and check all the possible keys. On average half way through the right key will be found. Only for an expected number of 2 191 keys which are confirmed with the first pair, we do further comparisons. Most of these 2
191 are false positives. The key remark is that the total number of these false positives is small and the complexity of rejecting all the incorrect keys with additional P/C pairs is actually negligible.
Low data complexity attacks on reduced-round GOST
Software algebraic attacks, can be defined as attacks in which the problem of key recovery is written as a problem of solving a large system of Boolean algebraic equations which follows the geometry and structure of a particular cryptographic circuit [4] . For block ciphers these attacks typically work only for a limited number of rounds, for example to break 6 rounds of DES, but this is possible to do given only 1 known plaintext, see [4] . Our most recent results are obtained as a combination of earlier software algebraic attacks on DES [4] with dedicated optimizations for GOST described in [13] and with highly optimized guess-then-determine steps inspired by Meet-In-The-Middle attacks. Following [6] : Ø 2.1.1 (Key Recovery for 8 Rounds and 3 KP)º Given 3 P/C pairs for 8 rounds of GOST we can produce 2 64 candidates for the 256-bit key in time equivalent to 2 110 GOST encryptions. The storage requirements are negligible and all the 2 64 candidates can be produced in a uniform way, each of them is produced in time of 2 56 GOST encryptions on average.
Full justification of this fact takes many pages and appears in Appendix N.3. page 94 of [6] . A faster attack with only 2 107 GOST encryptions BUT at the expense of MUCH larger memory is given in [8] . Similarly we have: In [8] we find two distinct attacks with complexity of 2 94 for 4 KP. One is an excessively technical MITM attack with large memory, another is a super simple software/algebraic/SAT-solver attack with same running time and negligible memory. The trick is to mimic the structure of a MITM attack and aim at a software/algebraic inversion attack. The attacker guesses the exact key bits 0-15,51-55,64-66,128-130,179-183,192-207,224-231,244-255 and is able to determine all the other by software.
Cryptanalysis with Black-Box Complexity Reduction
Following [6] , [7] the work of cryptanalyst working on cryptanalysis of GOST can be split into two independent tasks. First task is how to achieve a software algebraic attack on a reduced-round version as discussed in the previous section. The second question is if and how the complexity major variants of full GOST with 32 rounds can ever be reduced to a problem of breaking a cipher with significantly less rounds. Only then we can ever hope to be able to apply results such as Fact 2.1.2. Recently it became possible to design and implement an appropriate last step for many such attacks, cf. Fact 2.1.2 and many other in [6] , [8] , [14] .
The main idea is as follows [6] , [7] . In order to reduce the attack complexity, we exploit the self-similarity of the cipher (due, e.g., to a weak key schedule) and add some well-chosen assumptions which produce interesting and sometimes quite non-trivial consequences due to the high-level structural properties of the cipher, which makes cryptanalysis problems smaller, simpler and easier to solve. In this process we need to minimise the costs (in terms of probability that our assumptions hold) and to maximise the benefits (in terms of the number and the complexity of interesting relations which hold under these assumptions).
This process is called Algebraic Complexity Reduction, see [6] , [7] . In most cases what we get is to compute (guess or determine) many internal values inside one or several decryptions, and literally break the cipher apart into smaller pieces. In particular we have Black-Box Algebraic Complexity Reductions where we obtain real black-box reductions, for example, to the same cipher with strictly less rounds (and less data) again at the cost of some well-chosen assumptions. This creates new important optimisation problems in symmetric cryptanalysis. Reductions exploit self-similarity of different blocks and their inverses, fixed points in certain components, and reflections [6] , [7] . Reductions can be compared in terms of the number of pairs obtained, the resulting reduced number of rounds, success probability, and in terms of data complexity. In this paper we focus on weak key attacks which however are valuable only if and because, we will be able to achieve time complexities better than any attack on regular keys from [6] , [7] , [10] , [14] .
High-level structure and properties of GOST
GOST is a Feistel cipher with 32 rounds. In each round we have a round function f k (X) with a 32-bit key which uses a 32-bit segment of the original 256-bit key which is divided into eight 32-bit sub-
This pattern is repeated 3 times and the the order of keys is inverted.
Notation: Let S be the function which swaps two halves of a 64-bit word, i.e., S(L|R) = R|L. We denote the swapped value by notation A, i.e., S(A) = A. In figures we denote S by an explicit graphical notation .
Following [18] one can write GOST as the following functional decomposition (to be read from right to left)
where E is exactly the first 8 rounds which exploits the whole 256-bit key, S is the swap function which does not depend on the key, and D is the corresponding decryption function with This function has an exceptionally large number of fixed points: applied to X gives the same value X with probability 2 −32 over the choice of X, instead of 2 −64 for a random permutation.
Justification: This comes from the fact that the state of the cipher after the first 8 rounds E is symmetric with probability 2
, and D • E = Id.
Weak key attacks on GOST
Weak keys offer a considerable degree of extra freedom to the attacker. Let d denote the density of keys for which a given attack works, defined as the probability that the attack will work for a key chosen uniformly at random. Single key attacks work for typically more than half of all keys, with d ≥ 0.63 or better [6] , [7] . In this paper we will have d between 2 −32 and 2
−64
. It is plausible that such weak keys would occur in the real life. For example, given that the population of our planet is about 2
33
, and one person can use during their life many cryptographic keys, an attack with d = 2 −32 should be considered as nearly-realistic; it is plausible to assume that at some moment in the future 2 32 different GOST keys will be used worldwide and some keys will become vulnerable to our attacks. . For every key in Weak Keys Family 0, given 2 32 chosen plaintexts for GOST, we can compute A and obtain 1 P/C pair for 8 rounds of GOST correct with very high probability of roughly at least 2 −1 .
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Justification: If A is a symmetric value such that E(A) = A then Enc k (A) = A. However there are also, on average, about one values for which Enc k (A) = A, as every permutation of 64 bits has about one fixed point which occurs by accident, not due to the internal structure. Thus we obtain 1 P/C pair for 8 rounds of GOST E(A) = A, which is correct only with high probability of at least 1/2.
Key Recovery with Family 0
In [18] , this method of Fact 4.1.1 is used to recover keys with time complexity of 2 192 and negligible memory. This is very hard to improve because the attack uses only 1 KP for 32 rounds, and there are 2
192 keys for which this pair is correct, and all these keys must be checked against additional P/C pairs for the full 32-rounds. In the next sections we will introduce new families of weak keys able to achieve time complexities below 2 192 .
Weak Key Family 2.1
In this section we exhibit another family of weak keys, with the same density d = 2 −32 but with more extensive possibilities. It can be seen as an extension of the original double reflection attack described at Fig. 1 in Section 11 of [6] and the resulting double reflection attack. If we require that B is also symmetric, we will be able to simultaneously improve the probability of our guess being true, from 2 −128 to 2 −64 to obtain 4 P/C pairs for 8 rounds, and reduce the data complexity. We obtain a triple reflection attack and it works only for weak keys but the probability of these keys is quite large d = 2
−32
. We call it not Family 1 but Family 2.1 following a more extensive classification of attacks on GOST in [6] . .
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Rounds
Values Key size
bits 64 64 64 Figure 1 . A weak-key black-box reduction which gives up to 5 pairs for 8 rounds. . The attack is shown on Fig. 1 , where denotes S (swapping the two 32-bit halves). We have three encryptions with internal reflection C = Enc k (A), also B = Enc k (Z), and A = Enc k (Y ) where due to the internal reflection, we have C = E 2 (A), B = E 2 (Z), and A = E 2 (Y ).
Justification: It is easy to see that the event E(A) AND E 2 (A) AND E
There are two interesting attack scenarios. In all cases we start by guessing C and B which are symmetric and therefore, to decrypt these and obtain respectively A and Z we need only 2 32 CC. However if we also want to decrypt A to obtain Y, we need 2 64 KP. We proceed as follows:
1. We guess two symmetric values B, C. They are both correct with P = 2 −64 .
2. We determine A, Z by decrypting B and C which are both symmetric.
We get 3 pairs E(Z) = A, E(A) = B, E(B) = C and our guess is correct with probability 2 −64
. So far need 2 32 Chosen Ciphertext (CC).
4. Furthermore, if we also decrypt A we get Y and obtain one additional pair E(Y ) = Z. This is obtained at the price of 2 32 ACC (Adaptive Chosen Ciphertexts). Here though A is not symmetric we do NOT need 2 64 KP. We can decrypt all possible A obtained from decryption of all possible symmetric values C. This requires 2 32 ACC. . We need a total time of 2 64+94 = 2 158 GOST encryptions.
Going one step backwards, we don't decrypt A but also guess D which is symmetric, We get 4 pairs E(Z) = A, E(A) = B, E(B) = C, E(C)
=
An Attack with "Regular" Keys and 2 32 of Data per Device
In this sub-section we are going to convert our "weak key" attack into a "regular" attack with random 256-bit keys. The following attack scenario is relatively plausible 2 32 devices with different GOST keys. In this plausible "Multiple Key" scenario we are going to show how to break GOST with total cost of only 2 190 GOST encryptions (the total of data required is 2 64 ).
Justification:
We apply Fact 4.2.3 to each of the 2 32 devices with random keys. We recover one key out of 2 32 in total time of 2 32+158 including the time to check all the other devices. In one case on average, the attack will work and output a valid key which can be checked with additional pairs for that device. For the other devices the attack fails and we abort it after some 2 158 GOST encryptions. Quite remarkably the data complexity is only 2 32 per device. Single key attacks on GOST with 2 32 of data had always a cost of at least 2 224 per key found, see [6] , [14] , [17] . We are the first to achieve 2 190 GOST encryptions per key recovered, in a scenario with a realistic number of devices with different random 256-bit keys and with reasonable memory, beating all known attack on both time and memory. We have weak keys which ARE frequent enough to occur in the real life and they are also individually CHEAP enough to break, in order to worry about this attack overall, which is reflected by the total cost per key being 2 190 GOST encryptions.
Weak Key Family 3
In this section we explore if better attacks exist, and in particular attacks with complexity less than 2
128
, at the price of further decreasing the density of weak keys to values which are significantly less realistic but still non-negligible. . For every key in Family 3, we have the following: with 2 64 KP we obtain 4 P/C pairs for 8 rounds of GOST, correct with probability of roughly about P = 2 −1 .
Justification:
We proceed as follows:
1. First we observe that A is a fixed point for Enc k (·). Indeed
Therefore given 2 64 KP we can identify A. Due to other possible fixed points, our guess will be correct with probability roughly about P = 2 −1 .
Moreover if we define B = E(A) we have A = E(B) and
Therefore we can determine B from A. 3. Moreover, if we encrypt B we obtain another interesting value C defined as:
with the property that E(C) = B.
4. Overall our triple A, B, C will be correct with probability about P = 2 
Rounds
Values Key size Justification: This is obtained by combination of the current reduction of Fact 4.4.1 and Fact 2.1.2 for 4 KP. We estimate that the probability that we can guess correctly which fixed point A is the correct one is about half, and accordingly on average Fact 2.1.2 needs to be applied twice. The total number of false positives which need to be checked against additional P/C pairs for the full 32 rounds is small and can be neglected.
Attack on Regular Random 256-bit Keys with Total Time 2
159
Ø 4.5.1 (Key Recovery for a Diverse Population of Keys)º If we have a diverse population of at least 2 64 different keys, with access to 2 64 KP per key, one can recover one of these 256-bit keys in total overall time of about 2 159 GOST encryptions.
Justification:
We apply the Fact 4.4.2 to 2 64 random devices, for one of them on average in time 2 95 GOST encryptions it will output a valid key which can be checked with additional pairs. We abort all the other cases at 2 95 GOST encryptions.
This actually means that GOST keys can be recovered in overall total time of 2 159 per key for multiple keys generated at random, which is substantially less than 2 179 from [10] .
bits 64 64 64 
Weak Key Family 8.1
Here is another family of weak keys. We call Family 8.1 as it is known under this name in other papers [6] , [8] . In fact the paper [8] contains a replacement component for the Family 8.1 attack of this paper with 2 3 faster running time at the expense of much more memory. . For every key in Family 8.1, given 2 32 CP we can obtain 3 P/C pairs for 4 rounds of GOST, correct with probability close to 1.
Justification:
The expected number of cycles of length 3 for a random permutation is 1/3 = 2 −1.6 for detailed statistics on random permutations. The probability that a random 64-bit permutation has a cycle of length 3 with 3 symmetric points is roughly about 2 
Summary of our attacks
In Table 1 we compare our new attacks with weak and regular keys generated at random to earlier attacks. With regular keys there was no attack below 2
192
[6], [14] which is due to having 2 192 false positives, see [6] . . Again (cf. Fact 4.5.1), if GOST is used with at least 2 64 different keys, one can recover one of these keys in total time of not more than 2 159 GOST encryptions indluding the time to examine all the key where the attacks does not work. This is substantially less than 2
192 from [14] and even 2 179 from [10] . If we dispose of 2 159 GOST computations and not more, our attack works while no single key attack can achieve anything useful.
We can also compare all attacks with 2 32 of data per device. Until now all such attacks required at least 2 224 in [6] , [14] , [17] . In this paper for the first time ever we achieve 2 190 GOST encryptions per key recovered, in the scenario with a realistic number of devices with different random 256-bit keys. Arguably this paper achieves both the cheapest overall attack on GOST ever found with 2 32 of data per device and also with 2 64 of data per device. We see that the security of GOST degrades in a very substantial way in the multiple key scenario.
Some very recent attacks on GOST achieve even less, 2 130 per key [19] and even 2 120 per key, this however at the price of much higher 2 100 -ish total data requirements for all the devices combined, see [19] and Family 8.1 in this paper. The paper [8] contains a replacement last step for our Family 8.1 attacks which reduces time complexity by 2 3 at the expense of much higher memory. Other attacks on GOST achieve even substantially less but they introduce additional cryptanalytic techniques such as advanced differential properties with 2, 3 and 4 points cf. [6] . 
Conclusion
This paper studies several interesting weak key attack classes for the block cipher GOST. However, we are interested in such keys ONLY IF they can be transformed into a "regular" attack on GOST, when it is used with multiple 256-bit keys generated at random. Our key results are summarized in Table 1 .
We show that the security of GOST degrades surprisingly quickly when the key diversity grows. With 2 32 different keys generated at random, some keys can be recovered in time as little as 2
158
. Moreover we already have attacks in 2 95 for a still non-negligible proportion of 2 −64 of full 256-bit keys. We observe that 2 95 · 2 64 ≈ 2
159
. Accordingly we can achieve more than just a weak key attack. For each of our weak key attacks we transform it into a "regular" attack on a diverse population of random keys which is overall less costly and more feasible to execute. For example following Fact 4.5.1, given at least 2 64 different keys, with 2 64 KP per key, one can recover one of these keys in total time of not more than 2
. This including the time to examine all the other (stronger) keys. Our results need to be compared to the fastest known single-key attack on GOST. For [14] with slightly less memory. However importantly, ciphers are hardly ever used in practice with single keys. On the contrary. If we do not dispose of a computing power of 2
179
, none of these attacks is of any use. Is there a multiple key attack which is cheaper and more realistic than the best single key attack? If we dispose of say 2 159 computations, is it possible to recover some GOST keys? Furthermore, can we recover any 256-bit GOST keys generated at random given only 2 120 computations? Very surprisingly the answer is yes, we can. Even though this will require astronomical quantities of data, it requires only 2 32 of data per device.
Our research on GOST have irreversibly changed the way in which we now think about the security of block ciphers in general. Our main point is that the popular notion of a single-key attack is in fact too restrictive and does NOT capture all realistic attacks on a given cipher. Single key attacks on GOST in 2 179 remain infeasible. In contrast given as little as just 2 120 computations, see Fact 4.7.1, or even less, about 2 101 cf. further results in [6] , one can already recover some GOST keys. Again all these are "regular" attacks in which keys are random and uniformly distributed and weak keys occur with their natural probability. It appears that the multiple random key scenario is stronger and more versatile than the single key scenario, this from a very pragmatic point of view, the cost per key recovered. and if we dispose of sufficient data. We should never again consider that a block cipher which is not broken by a single key attack is secure.
Faster attacks can be obtained if we combine the techniques of this paper with advanced differential properties [10] - [12] , which is really outside the scope of this paper. A number of combined attacks with complexity reduction and advanced differential properties with 2, 3 and 4 points and additional dedicated steps allow to bring our 2 120 per key further down to about 2
101
, cf. [6] .
